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I

n a meeting I had with a high-ranking military official in Afghanistan, the
conversation turned to Mexico’s ongoing drug violence. He exclaimed, “now
there’s a place that could use a dose of counterinsurgency.” He seemed to be
encouraging Andrew Bacevich’s leeriness about the Department of Defense’s
current thinking on Mexico:
To frame the problem [in Mexico] as an insurgency almost necessarily invites a military response. I would be skeptical that a response
that puts a primary emphasis on military power would be appropriate.
The [US] military that once claimed to have war figured out with
“shock and awe” as a model now claims to have war figured out
as counterinsurgency. Rather than treating different cases as distinctive, I think there is a tendency to apply the template, and today the
template is counterinsurgency.1

There has been a very active debate over how to describe the violence
occurring in Mexico. Is it narcoinsurgency, narcoterrorism, or a crime wave
that is gripping Mexico? This is more than a mere academic debate. Such
distinctions may not seem important as all insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and organized crime syndicates share a number of organizational and
operational characteristics.
They are 1) involved in illegal activities and frequently need the same
supplies; 2) exploit excessive violence and the threat of violence; 3)
commit kidnappings, assassinations and extortion; 4) act in secrecy;
5) challenge the state and the laws (unless they are state funded); 6)
have back up leaders and foot soldiers; 7) are exceedingly adaptable,
open to innovations, and are flexible; 8) threaten global security;
9) quitting the group can result in deadly consequences for former
members.2

Defining the particular type of organized violence has deep and far-reaching
implications for policy makers responsible for designing the strategies that need
to be implemented by those who face this ongoing violence on a daily basis.
Terms such as “insurgency” and “terrorism” create policy options and strategic
choices distinct from those that would be in responses to “criminality.”
Paul Rexton Kan is Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry
L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College. He is the author of
Drugs and Contemporary Warfare (Potomac Books) and recently completed field research
along the US-Mexico border for his upcoming book, Cartels at War: Mexico’s Drug
Fueled Violence and the Challenge to US National Security (Potomac Books).
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Following a visit to Mexico in late 2008, General Barry R. McCaffrey
(US Army, Retired), former head of the US Office of National Drug Control
Policy, wrote that, “Mexico is not confronting dangerous criminality—it is
fighting for survival against narcoterrorism.”3 A growing number of scholars
and commentators not only agree with McCaffrey’s assertion but go even
further. Security historian and professor of public policy Hal Brands has called
Mexican violence a “multisided narco-insurgency; well financed cartels are
doing battle with the government and one another for control of the drug corridors into the United States . . . significantly destabilizing internal order in
Mexico.”4 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Mexico as “looking
more and more like Colombia looked twenty years ago.”5 The cartels are able
to destabilize Mexico because they “have better weapons and better armor than
Mexican or US law enforcement. They have similar, and often superior, training.”6 They are, simply put, “the guerrillas next door.”7 For political scientist
and author Dr. Robert Bunker, the result is a “state that is no longer able to
govern entire sectors within its sovereign territory and, instead, these areas
have been taken over by a narco-insurgency and lost to the influence of criminal-based entities.”8 The implications, according to author Max Manwaring,
may be “some manifestation of state failure.”9
Given the nearly 40,000 deaths in Mexico since President Felipe
Calderon declared a war against the cartels, and in light of the scope, intensity,
and effects of the violence, it is tempting to agree with notions that Mexico
is experiencing some type of intrastate war or direct assault on the state. If
these arguments by the narcoinsurgency/narcoterrorism school are accurate in
describing the situation in Mexico, they need to answer a number of troublesome questions.

Beyond a Crime Wave, But Not Low-Intensity Conflict
The first set of questions that the narcoinsurgency/narcoterrorism proponents have trouble reconciling is why the violence in Mexico began. If cartels
are akin to insurgents or terrorists, what are their grievances and what political
or social goals are they fighting to assuage these grievances? Put another way,
what is the “rallying cry” for their constituency? The current outbreak of cartel
violence is a continuation of the violence of the 1990s which was primarily motivated by new trafficking opportunities, the breakdown in the political-criminal
nexus in Mexico, and improved border security. The success that cartels had
in penetrating the political realm of Mexico or purging local communities
of mayors and police through bribery, extortion, and coercive violence have
ensured the smooth operation of profit-making activities via the drug trade. In
the majority of instances, they have not “captured” the state to implement any
social or political agenda, rather their objective has been to neutralize the power
of the state. For example, according to the trial testimony of former Juarez police
captain Juan Fierro Mendez, cartels seek to control smuggling routes known as
plazas in an effort “to maintain order over the local, state, and federal agencies
then to have free reign to continue trafficking drugs without any problem.”10
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Terror and insurgent groups try to sway constituents with violence; cartels try
to satisfy clients by circumventing or undermining the state.11 Unlike terrorists and insurgents, the cartels
in Mexico are not motivated to
. . . violence directed at the state
create a homeland to call their
mirrors the level and type of
own, substitute their ideology
for an existing one, or achieve
violence used by Colombia’s
any political goal routinely
Medellin cartel in the 1980s . . . .
associated with armed groups
that instigate social upheaval.
Another critical question is whether tactical qualities of the cartels
equal an insurgent or terrorist threat to the Mexican state. The narcoinsurgency/
narcoterrorism school argues that they do because the cartels’ sophisticated
weaponry and proficiency of violence often match or outstrip the police and
military. But equipment and tactics do not exist in isolation. Improved tactics,
skills, and weapons are not a substitute for a strategic political objective which
tactics are intended to serve. Having better weapons does not compensate for a
cause. It would be as if J. Edgar Hoover declared Al Capone and his gang to be
insurgents because they had tommy guns while local police merely had pistols.
Another related question is who are the targets of cartel violence? The answer
is revealing—less than ten percent of the deaths in Mexico have been agents of
the state. If there were an all-out assault by the cartels against the Mexican state,
as in an insurgency, the proportion would be much higher. Even violent acts by
the cartels and gangs directed at government targets are meant as a signal for
the government to retreat from its confrontational stance; they are designed to
intimidate the government rather than to serve as a political statement.12 In fact,
the violence directed at the state mirrors the level and type of violence used by
Colombia’s Medellin cartel in the 1980s when Pablo Escobar directed an attack
on the Palace of Justice and was responsible for the mid-air destruction of a
passenger jet, killing 110 people. As with the Medellin cartel, Mexican cartels
attempt to intimidate the state in an effort to protect their economic interests,
avoid incarceration, and keep their families out of harm’s way.13 The fact that
the narcoinsurgency/narcoterrorism school focuses the bulk of its attention on
cartel violence directed against the state misses the important fact that the vast
majority of violence is generated between and within cartels. Such omissions
and lack of analysis result in a large gap in the overall assessment of what is
actually happening in Mexico.
The strategic rationale for violence and the tactics employed by the
cartels do not support the narcoinsurgency/narcoterrorism school’s assessment
of the situation in Mexico; and the fact that they fail to address questions about
how to end the violence weakens their analysis even more. Most insurgent and
terrorist groups have goals that are negotiable, once again because these goals
are generally political in nature. Given the current level of violence, it is hard to
foresee how negotiations with the cartels might occur. The criminal nature of
the cartels’ enterprises negates any possibility that the government and cartels

Summer 2011

39

Paul Rexton Kan

could find the common ground needed to initiate a “peace process.” Would the
Mexican government grant pardons and amnesties for cartel leaders and gang
members if they agree to cease operations? Such an offer, implausible as it may
seem, would be rejected by a cartel whose main objective is to make money
through illicit activities; it would be an invitation to go out of business.
Other than through successful peace negotiations, terrorism and insurgencies can end in a variety of ways. Insurgents and terrorist organizations may
have been unable to pass their cause on to another generation of activists; they
might lose popular support; sometimes they have transitioned into legitimate
political entities; or they may have been defeated or repressed by the established
authority and their leaders captured or killed.14 Many organized crime groups
have met similar ends, but they could have been defeated by financial strangulation, while it is almost impossible for an insurgent or terrorist organization to be
defeated by dismantling its financial networks. Insurgent and terrorist organizations can support their armed struggles in any number of ways. For example,
states may sponsor them, so may charities, sympathetic communities, and even
other armed groups. But because an organized crime group is a profit-seeking
entity at its core, governments that have executed long-term strategies directed
at the cartels’ finances have been relatively successful. “Indeed, every time a
criminal cartel has been challenged with the appropriate level of resources,
legal tools and political determination, it has been defeated.”15
The proponents of the narcoinsurgency/narcoterrorism school are
making the mistake of equating low intensity conflict with what might be
better labeled “high-intensity crime.”16 Professor John Mueller uses the term
to describe criminal acts (looting, raping, trafficking in illicit goods) that
occur during intrastate conflict and that might distort the political objectives of
warring parties. The term, rather than its meaning, appropriately describes the
Mexican trafficking organizations and their form of extreme violence. Mexico
is not suffering from an insurgency or terrorist threat. The purpose of the violence executed by the cartels in Mexico is quite different. One person’s gangster
is not another person’s terrorist or insurgent.17 While insurgent, terroristic, and
criminal violence may challenge the authority, legitimacy, and capacity of the
state, they do so for varying reasons that should not be conflated. By challenging the authority of a government, all terrorists and insurgents may be
considered criminals, but not all criminals are insurgents or terrorists.
Even though the current violence in Mexico cannot properly be classified as terrorism or an insurgency, it is more than just a crime wave by street
gangs. High-intensity crime involves criminal activities that are more violent
and widespread in scope and are usually, but not always, sustained over a long
period. A crime wave is generally accompanied by a sharp uptick in illegal
activities impacting a single city or neighborhood within a city; it is relatively
brief and normally does not include increases in violence. Crime waves may
include such things as burglaries and theft. Mexico by contrast has suffered multiple and sustained outbreaks of violence exemplified by an increasing number
of murders, extortion, kidnappings, and mutilations. This level of violence has

40Parameters

What We’re Getting Wrong About Mexico

been perpetrated by at least seven cartels and over two dozen groups and gangs
in a number of cities over an extended period.
Beyond Mexico, there have been a number of other examples of highintensity crime, including Colombia’s struggle against the Medellin and Cali
cartels; post-Soviet Russia’s battles with the mafiya; and Italy’s crackdown on
the Sicilian mafia. High-intensity crime in these cases are similar in structure
to the factors influencing Mexico—a change in the political-criminal nexus, the
emergence of new illegal opportunities, and a more confrontational approach
by the state. In the case of Colombia, the Medellin cartel was trying to expand
its reach into Cali’s markets at the same time as the Colombian government was
launching a crackdown against the Medellin cartel.18 Pablo Escobar declared war
against the Colombian government and attacked an array of civilian and state
targets. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party removed
the social and political mechanisms that had permitted the elite exploitation of
organized crime and kept the level of violence under control. The traditional
vory-v-zakone mafia groups were challenged by new, more entrepreneurial,
criminals; competition erupted between ethnic criminal organizations (Slavic
groups versus those from the Caucasus), and competing criminal organizations
fought for dominance in particular sectors of the economy. The Sicilian Mafia
in the early 1990s attacked the Italian state in retaliation for a betrayal of the
long-term relationship with the Christian Democrat Party in which political
protection was traded for electoral support. This retaliation was manifested
in the killings of magistrates and a broad campaign of intimidation, targeting
civilians and even some of Italy’s historic monuments.
In Mexico’s recent spate of high-intensity crime, the targets of the
cartels have been wide ranging—from police to journalists, from clinics to
discos, military bases to children’s birthday parties. “Criminal cleansing” has
occurred in Mexican towns where cartels have ordered residents to leave or
face possible death. High-intensity crime is complex in its manifestation and
confounding to traditional military and law enforcement solutions. As a result,
there is great difficulty for governments on either side of the border to fight
this type of war and to bring the violence under control. As author R. T. Naylor
argues, “The violence of the state is often a response to the violence of the
criminal; the reverse is also true. And once the interactive cycle of violence
is set in motion, it may be impossible to separate action from reaction, or to
say for sure if the reduction in the use of violence on one side will lead to the
same on the other.”19 This frustration over cause and effect is part of the reason
why various individuals and organizations use inappropriate labels from other
types of conflict to describe the situation in Mexico. “The nub of the problem,
then, is that iron responses to violent non-state actors of all types and character
. . . are no substitute for case specific, strategic judgments.”20 An alternative
concept is required to more accurately describe and assess the ongoing violence
in Mexico, its dynamics and its potential end.
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Violence and High-Intensity Crime
Various groups are organized so that under certain conditions they will
exercise collective violence to achieve a particular goal or set of goals. The violence in Mexico has often been confused with low-intensity conflict; however,
there are differences between low-intensity and high-intensity crimes. In
Mexico, as with the instances in Colombia, Russia, and Italy, high-intensity
crime is due to a war waged by violent entrepreneurs who seek to prevail over
one another and the state in a hypercompetitive illegal market. Violent entrepreneurs are mostly private groups that create “a set of organizational solutions
and action strategies enabling organized force (or organized violence) to be
converted into money or other valuable assets on a permanent basis . . . .Violent
entrepreneurship is a means of increasing the private income of the wielders of
force through ongoing relations of exchange with other groups that own other
resources.”21 For violent entrepreneurs, the use of force is simply an extension
of the profit motive, rather than the extension of a political agenda. Violence
itself is a means, not an end; it is “a resource, not the final product.”22 Drug
cartels are a type of violent entrepreneurship because they derive their income
by force to succeed in private transactions that are circumscribed or prohibited
by the state. As a resource, violence is exercised by the cartels to ensure that
the product, which is illegal in nature, is delivered to its client base for profit.
Drug trafficking is a highly risky venture. Due to the product’s illegality, it is “vulnerable to lawful seizure as well as to theft; property rights cannot
rely on written records and are generally poorly defined; liability is restricted to
the physical person; individual mobility is greater; and agents are tougher, more
prone to risk, and more secretive than their law abiding counterparts.”23 When
it comes to markets for illegal products, such as marijuana, heroin, cocaine,
and methamphetamine, avenues for conventional settlement of disputes are not
available. The main consequence for those operating in these illegal markets is
far-reaching, because there is no legal arbiter or legitimate enforcer to guarantee an agreement among the participants to produce or deliver the commodity.
All transactions related to illegal markets are prone to violence.
Most of the time “illegal drug markets are generally peaceable.”24
Violent entrepreneurs at the higher end of the trafficking network often conduct
themselves peacefully and cooperate with others while, at times, even colluding with state agents. This is another fact that separates violent entrepreneurs
from insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists. Namely, interactions between violent
entrepreneurs (and the state in many cases) are characterized by considerable
cooperation.25 While this may belie the term “violent entrepreneurs,” it does not
detract from the use of force as the means for ultimate arbitration should cooperation fail. This is dramatically demonstrated in a hypercompetitive illegal market
having a number of unique characteristics. First, the commodity and its delivery
are illegal and the market size for the commodity is great as well as the number
of violent entrepreneurs seeking to control the distribution of commodity are
numerous. Second, there is no powerful arbiter capable of enforcing agreements
between these violent entrepreneurs. Third, the state’s actions to curtail the
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market often results in a spin-off market emerging as a result of the competition
over the commodity in dispute.
Narcotics trafficking is the sine qua non of a hypercompetitive illegal
market because marijuana, heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine are all illegal
products, as is their delivery. Although the environment surrounding this marketplace may appear peaceful, it is highly susceptible to the use of violence.26
Disputes often arise over price, purity, delivery times and location, personnel,
territory, payment, seizure, theft, and secrecy. With 1,500 metric tons of marijuana, 15 metric tons of heroin, 200 metric tons of cocaine, and 20 metric tons
of meth coming from Mexico yearly,27 the sheer volume of illegal narcotics trafficking when combined with the number of cartels and gangs involved almost
guarantees violence at a geometric rate. In addition, the consumer market in
Mexico is now a $1 billion enterprise. According to a drug survey conducted
by the Mexican health ministry, over 50 percent (465,000) more Mexicans have
become addicted to illegal drugs since 2002.28 With an ever-growing number
of violent entrepreneurs operating within and competing for the same territory,
there is little incentive to establish any long-standing balance of power between
competitors. Alliances are ad hoc and only established for convenience, often
deteriorating in extreme violence.
The scale of the drug trade, number of competitors, shifting alliances,
and US and Mexico’s interdiction efforts all help to explain why the cartels
require these sophisticated arsenals. They are forced to increase acquisition of
higher-end firearms and intelligence gathering technology in an effort to mitigate short- and long-term risk.29 Many of the weapons that Mexican authorities
face are equivalent to that encountered by US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,
to include improvised explosive devices. The introduction of Colombian cocaine
into Mexico was especially pernicious. The extended supply route from the
Andes into North America has proven difficult to secure, exacerbating security
issues and requiring more firepower and intelligence.
Closely related to the multiple areas of contention is the second characteristic of a hypercompetitive market characterized by vicious competition in
the absence of an arbiter capable of imposing order (a corrupt state, dominant
cartel, or concert of cartels). This competition may be the result of deteriorating
long-standing arrangements between cartels, state officials, or when the state
actively seeks to curtail the market. In such an environment, “sellers compete,
not by improving quality or reducing prices, but by acquiring more efficient
violent skills in order to enlarge their share of the market.”30 A former agent with
the Drug Enforcement Administration described how Mexican cartels behaved
as a result of the lack of a powerful arbiter: “They would kill people who didn’t
cooperate. They would kill people who didn’t pay a fee or a toll (for moving
drugs through their territory). They would kill people who were not necessarily
disloyal to them. They killed them to set an example.”31 The pressure from
both the US and Mexican governments has only heightened this atmosphere of
uncertainty for cartels. When the agents of the government begin to challenge
organizations that are operating in the marketplace or make some attempt at
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drastically reducing an organization’s power, cartels have an incentive to resort
to increased violence in an effort to protect themselves and their livelihoods.
Cartels in those hypercompetitive markets can actually be more violent
than terrorist or insurgent groups, meaning that high-intensity crime can result
in even greater violence and death than some low-intensity conflicts. Mexico is
a perfect example of this environment; when the level and intensity of violence
generated by the cartels is worse than that of the Zapatista insurgency during
its heyday in the mid-1990s. In fact, more people have been killed by the cartels
since 2006 than were killed by the Irish Republican Army and Loyalist groups
during the decades long “Troubles” in Northern Ireland (over 3,500) and exceeds
the number of deaths inflicted by Turkey’s long-running Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) insurgent group (over 12,000). One confirming statistic is the fact
that the world’s highest murder rate is found in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.32
Finally, hypercompetitive markets are also characterized by other
collateral crimes such as kidnappings and contract murders that are actually
submarkets spawned by competition over the illegal commodity in dispute.
Enforcer groups are often hired to kidnap and kill those who have reneged
on a deal or to kidnap and kill relatives of participants in the dispute. Much
of the spillover violence in cities like Phoenix, Tucson, and San Diego is the
product of this ancillary market. These activities become another source of
illicit income and profit with all the accompanying consequences, pressures,
and points of contention found in the main market. In Mexico, kidnapping is
one of the least punished crimes; it rose fifteen percent in 2010 and has tripled
since 2006.33 These ancillary activities, in effect, become another market to
fight over. For example, a portion of the violence in Tijuana during 2008 was
related to a dispute over the Arellano Felix Organization’s expansion into kidnapping.34 The result of these additional submarkets is the exacerbation of the
intensity and scope of the violence.
For governments, combating violent entrepreneurs in hypercompetitive
illegal markets differs from fighting insurgents and terrorists. There are clients
and demand drivers to take into consideration when confronting them that are
different from dealing with insurgent or terrorist networks. Counternarcotics,
counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations are not the same. Merely
because they share a common prefix does not mean that they can be employed
toward a common end. Notions of victory, defeat, armistice and peace conditions found in low-intensity conflicts are not suitable solutions for high-intensity
crime. Wars can end, but crime rarely does. Drug trafficking has been especially
difficult to eliminate, reduce, or control. For example, in those cases where
governments have succeeded in capturing leading drug traffickers and disrupting their networks, they have simply created an opportunity for other criminal
enterprises to assume the vacated market share.35 Governments can reduce
high-intensity crime by managing the hypercompetitive characteristics of the
illegal markets or by eliminating and co-opting violent entrepreneurs in their
efforts to mitigate the negative effects on society. Governments can also pressure violent entrepreneurs to a “break-even point” where cartels begin to view
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violence as costing them more than the effort is worth. Nonetheless, in most
cases where the violence has been reduced, the illegal markets have endured.

High-Intensity Crime in Mexico
The United States and Mexico will be inevitably bound together in
whatever future scenario or scenarios unfold. Policies and strategies will have to
be carefully coordinated to avoid stoking even greater cartel violence, increasing the amount of drugs smuggled into the United States, and possibly eroding
Mexico’s governmental capacity further. A lack of coordination or impromptu
acts by either government only runs the risk of making the worst-case scenario
a reality. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are incongruent means to
defeat high-intensity crime. Adopting either of these strategies not only runs the
risk of failure but also exacerbates the violence and ruptures US and Mexico relations. There are a host of other important issues unrelated to high-intensity crime
that may be impacted, such as immigration, trade, and response to pandemics.
While an immediate goal is the reduction of violence in Mexico, expediency should not be a substitute for the creation of long-range, durable practices
by legitimate institutions serving the citizens of a democracy. To confront highintensity crime, Mexico, with cooperation from the United States, should engage
in “high-intensity law enforcement,” providing multifaceted and focused public
safety in this complex law and order environment and doing so within strong
constitutional boundaries. Rather than a military strategy focused on killing or
capturing the enemy or a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign to
secure the population, the focus of high-intensity law enforcement is to bring
criminal offenders to justice and prevent an increase in violent crime.
This is not to suggest that the answer to Mexico’s high-intensity crime
is merely to flood the streets with police officers while dispensing basic civil
liberties. Increased levels of policing, but not necessarily aggressive policing,
is part of any response to high levels of crime. Mexico need not become a
police state, or even a state full of police. In fact, the number of police officers
is not a problem in Mexico. With 366 officers per 100,000 people, Mexico
has a better ratio of police to citizens than the United States, Britain, France,
or Italy.36 The problem lies in their distribution; it is uneven and causing significant gaps in law enforcement capabilities. With over 2,000 municipalities,
Mexico’s municipal police are found in only 335 municipalities. Of these 335
municipalities, 87 utilize 69 percent of the resources and manpower, leaving
the remaining municipalities with only 30 percent.37 For example, there are
not enough Mexican military or federal police to patrol the rugged terrain of
Sonora and Chihuahua.38 This effectively abdicates power in those regions to
the Sinaloa cartel. Deterring crime rests on the ability of the police to “gather
evidence, solve crime and make arrests. Any measure associated with the cost
of crime [on the part of a criminal] ultimately rests on this activity.”39 Reducing
zones of impunity and sustaining their reduction can only be achieved through
a thoroughly capable and non-corrupt police presence.
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High-intensity law enforcement is a comprehensive, long-term strategy. It is an approach that addresses the many pieces of a complex problem,
its goal is the reduction of the drug-fueled violence. Ideally, this strategy will
result in a manageable law and order solution, similar to the organized crime
threat found in the vast majority of other countries. It is not a military strategy
that seeks victory as a viable goal. High-intensity law enforcement in this environment seeks to return criminal violence to the normal levels prior to 2006.
This approach includes development programs and economic investment in the
areas where cartels operate and recruit. If these programs are properly focused,
they can aid in crime prevention in the long run. With persistence and creativity, this may lead to changes in civic culture that reject, or at least effectively
resist, the allure of cartels and gangs.
A long-term commitment to high-intensity law enforcement needs to
be paired with Mexican willingness to end the criminal-patronage networks.
There needs to be enough political will to break the links between traffickers
and politicians. Without a concentrated effort to weaken this political-criminal
nexus, any attempt to challenge the cartels will be destined to fail.
A multinational presence is also part of any high-intensity law enforcement effort. Because drug violence impacts US interests and drug trafficking
has regional implications, nations around the globe should be involved in
assisting the Mexican government. In fact, other nations such as the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Colombia have a history of successfully
implementing tough law enforcement reforms; these experiences and expertise
can be of great benefit to Mexico in its current struggle. The third member of
North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada, also has a number of excellent resources that can be useful to Mexico. For example, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) has a splendid record of tackling money laundering,
which could help Mexican authorities.

High-Intensity Law Enforcement and the Future of Mexico
High-intensity law enforcement is an imperfect approach to counter
high-intensity crime, but it avoids the concept and policy traps presented by
the various strategies associated with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
The struggle against Mexico’s violent entrepreneurs will be long and uncertain.
As entrepreneurs of illegal businesses, the Mexican cartels will continue to
innovate in their efforts to survive and generate profits. If such criminal innovation is to be countered, there needs to be mutually reinforcing cooperation
from governments on both sides of the border. Hopefully, the result will be a
more peaceful Mexico ensconced in a thriving and mutually beneficial relationship with the United States.
Notes
1. Adam Entous and Nathan Hodge, “US Sees Heightened Threat in Mexico,” The Wall Street
Journal, September 10, 2010.

46Parameters

What We’re Getting Wrong About Mexico
2. Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate:
Funding Terrorism Through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30,
no. 10 (2007): 903.
3. General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret), “Narco-Violence in Mexico: A Growing Threat
to U.S. Security,” After Action Report—VISIT MEXICO—5–7 December 2008, 4, http://www.unc.
edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0103/comm/mccaffery_mexico.html (accessed September 13, 2011).
4. Hal Brands, Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Library, 2009), 4-5.
5. Entous and Hodge, US Sees Heightened Threat, 8.
6. Sylvia Longmire and John Longmire IV, “Redefining Terrorism: Why Mexican Drug
Trafficking is More than Just Organized Crime,” Journal of Strategic Studies (November 2008): 37.
7. Lincoln B. Krause, “The Guerrillas Next Door: A Short History of Mexico’s Armed
Revolutionaries from the 1960s to the EZLN Uprising of 1994,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law
Enforcement (Spring 1999): 34-56.
8. Robert J. Bunker, “Strategic Threat: Narcos and Narcotics Overview,” Small Wars and
Insurgencies (March 2010): 10.
9. Max Manwaring, A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009), 2.
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